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NATIONAL IDENTITY AND CONSTITUTIONS IN MODERN EUROPE: INTO THE FIFTH  ZONE. 
 
Bill Kissane and Nick Sitter  
 
The source of sovereignty is one of the central constitutional questions: in whose name is a 
constitution adopted, and whom does the government represent? This chapter explores 
how modern European constitutions have addressed issues of national identity. Many of the 
older constitutions were written – in what we call the first two ‘time zones’ of European 
nationalism - before nationalism became a dominant political ideology. They rarely 
addressed territory or citizenship in national terms. Many later constitutions – in time zones 
three and four – resulted from the establishment of nation states and addressed such issues 
more explicitly.
1
 More recently, challenges to  European integration and to  globalisation 
have created a fifth time zone.  
 
There is a fundamental difference between the idea of a constitution as a contract that lays 
down rules about the distribution of power, and as a covenant between a people and a 
state. We adapt Gellner’s (1997) ‘time zones’ of European nationalism in order to show  the 
impact of nationalism on constitutional politics across time and space. Gellner used the time 
zones idea to show the diffusion across Europe of the nationalist principle that state and 
nation be congruent. It provides an account – sensitive to both chronology and geography – 
of the transition from a non-national world of Empires and tiny polities to one of 
homogenous nation-states. It begins in a world of Empires and micro-polities -where 
ethnicity had little relevance to politics - and ends with states based on nationalist ideas. We 
adapt the approach in order to show different approaches to the nationalist principle in 
constitutions. Where there were ‘customary marriages’ between existing states and nations 
when constitutions were written, we expect nationalism to play a smaller role in 
constitutions than in cases where new nation-states were recently founded. The 
prominence of national identity in constitutions has increased over time, from east to west. 
It is low or non-existent in the first and second zones, whereas the tension between liberal 
and nationalist norms becomes far clearer in the third fourth and fifth zones. 
 
Most historical analyses that divide the continent into zones, such as Rokkan (1970) and Tilly 
(1975), use similar criteria and comparable zones. These include the long-standing 
monarchies on the Atlantic seaboard, the territories that made up the Holy Roman Empire, 
and the European lands of the Russian and Ottoman empires. More recently Gellner (1997) 
added states that went through communism as a fourth zone. We take Gellner as our 
starting-point because he explicitly focuses on the relationship between state and nation. 
He uses the time zones to show how different historical and structural legacies gave rise to 
varied responses to the ‘one state, one culture’ formula across Europe. Gellner saw a 
general transition to industrial modernity, but used the time zones approach to capture the 
varieties of experience within this transition: ‘it was all, in a systematic way, rather different 
in different places’, he wrote (1994: 28). What matters most is the nature of the polity at 
the start of each zone. Where it was national (time zone one) a state-based nationalism 
followed, and constitutions remained monarchical. Where the political units were sub-
national (time zones two, e.g.  Germany, Italy and Romania) unification nationalism 
                                                 
1
 We first set out the analysis of only four time zones  in Kissane and Sitter (2010). Adding a fifth zone, here we 
draw on but elaborate on this work when it comes to the first four zones. 
emerged and liberalism was its core constitutional doctrine. And where the state was multi-
national (time zones three and four) separatist nationalism was the response. We also add a 
fifth time zone in order to compare nationalist responses to a supra-national polity, the 
European Union. While the diffusion of the nationalist idea across the first three zones was 
from west to east, this is not true of the fifth zone; today all  Europe’s regions  are equally 
agitated by global developments. One difference is that the constitutional nationalism of the 
fifth zone is not driven by the rise and fall of nation-states. Yet it may  lead to the break-up 
of some states.  Three of Europe’s oldest constitutional orders, all along the western 
seaboard – Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom – come to mind. 
 
Time Zone One: The Atlantic Seaboard Monarchies 
 
Most Atlantic seaboard monarchies went through the transformation from the monarchical 
state to the nation-state without major territorial adjustments. Limited government in the 
name of the nation was developed in well-established political territorial units. 
Constitutional politics focussed on lowering what Rokkan (1970) called the ‘thresholds of 
democratisation’: recognition that the opposition was legitimate, and expanded access to 
political institutions. The notion of representative government was given a dramatic boost 
by the American and French revolutions, and this ideal was present even in the constitutions 
of the legitimist restorations that followed the Congress of Vienna (Hawgood 1964). In 
Gellner’s terms the British, Swedish, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, Danish, and even 
Norwegian constitutional arrangements were customary marriages of old states to well-
established nations, where cultural homogenization predated 1789. There was no need to 
make this connection explicit. The term ‘nation’ was barely used in these constitutions. 
Where the nation was conceptualised, it implied membership of a political community 
defined primarily by territory or royal allegiance (Hobsbawm 1990). Because constitutions 
did not constitute new states, national identity played at best a limited role. 
 
The first constitutions of the Atlantic seaboard monarchies conform to the pattern 
suggested by Gellner. They invoked the monarch and/or the territorial state as the source of 
legitimacy, rather than the nation. If the king did not actually grant the constitution (Sweden 
1772, 1810; Denmark 1849), it was enacted by the representatives of the kingdom (Norway 
1814, Portugal 1822) or in the name of the kingdom and its inhabitants (Netherlands 1815). 
In revolutionary France (1791), the constitution was granted by the national assembly; in 
1814 and 1830 it was granted by the king. The Spanish constitution of 1812 was unique in 
stipulating that sovereignty resided in the nation. This reflected an aspiration for full male 
citizenship in the context of a popular war against France. It is noteworthy that even the 
Norwegian constitution of 1814, which represented a bid to establish national 
independence, makes no reference to the nation. The Swedish and British constitutions are 
paradigm cases. They consist of a series of documents and norms that regulate the 
relationship between a long-established monarchy and its parliament. Yet national identity 
later came to play a role in both Swedish and UK politics. Demands for national autonomy 
culminated in Norwegian independence in 1905 and the Irish Free State in 1921. Devolution 
of power to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland now makes for considerable asymmetry 
in the UK constitution. For Sweden the main question after Norwegian independence was 
the right of Swedish-speakers in independent Finland, but the victory of the Whites in the 
civil war and the Aaland treaty of 1921 settled this question.  
 A second, radical, set of constitutions grew out of the French revolution, the Napoleonic 
wars and the revolutions of 1848-49. These documents reflected a context where popular 
representation was a central concern. The French constitutions of the 1790s, the 
Portuguese constitution of 1822 and the Dutch and Danish constitutions of 1848/49 
involved challenges to royal authority in the name of popular sovereignty. The same goes 
for the constitutions of several German states in the 1830s (Saxony, Brunswick and 
Hanover), Piedmont in 1848, and Prussia in 1850. In practice, however, these radical 
constitutions represented compromises between liberal demands and the old order, and 
entailed narrower franchises than the 1832 Reform Act would introduce in Britain 
(Hawgood 1964: 191). In almost all these cases the liberal forces represented a relatively 
homogeneous cultural group, so the identity questions were not pivotal.  
 
The third set of constitutions in the first zone includes the legitimist constitutions 
established after the defeat of the radical republics and kingdoms of Napoleonic Europe. 
Here the context was explicitly anti-nationalist, because the key political fault-lines had 
been between radical forces and the ‘legitimist’ monarchical regimes. For this reason the 
source of legitimacy and constitutional authority remained monarchical. National identity 
played even less of a role in constitutional politics than in the more liberal states. In France, 
Spain and Portugal the political contests were between the liberal state-building forces and 
conservative Catholic forces, each of which would dominate certain periods of the 
Nineteenth Century.  
 
Time Zone Two: Liberal Nationalism  
 
As liberal constitutionalism spread across Central Europe, constitutions were increasingly 
written in the name of peoples that lacked a long-standing territory. Constitution-making 
was identified with state-building, even if the projects were by and large viewed through the 
prism of liberalism: a stronger state would enhance individual freedom and provide for 
economic development. ‘The nation’ was employed rhetorically, as an argument against 
despotism, but not in the sense of establishing a state on the basis of cultural 
distinctiveness. By the close of the Nineteenth Century the map of Central Europe was 
dominated by states that had barely existed in the Eighteenth: Belgium, Italy, Germany, 
Switzerland, Austria and Hungary. In Gellner’s terms the nation existed in most of them as a 
high culture, but its marriage with the state required new political entities. National identity 
was imbued with more significance than in zone one. It was a ‘thicker’ concept, which 
implied a political community with a common culture and history (Brubaker 1992). 
Nevertheless, the connection between state and nation was rarely made explicit in 
constitutions. Further south and east, a range of new states emerged as the Ottoman 
Empire declined: Greece, Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia were in a zone where even the 
existence of the nation in Gellner’s sense was questionable. Here the need to upgrade the 
nation to fulfil the criteria of statehood was more pressing. 
 
Belgium’s secession from the Netherlands in 1830 and the Swiss settlement after the 1847 
Soderbund war are classic cases where the ‘nation’ was invoked by liberals against 
conservatives. The imperative of democratization was as important as that of state- or 
nation-building. Belgian and Swiss constitutional politics centred on the demand for liberal 
and representative government, rather than for government in the name of the nation. The 
Belgian constitution was the most liberal document of its kind in Europe at the time. This 
liberal imperative involved vesting sovereignty in the nation, and the constitution included 
strict citizenship laws based on parentage. The highly liberal Swiss 1848 constitution invoked 
both the cantons and the Swiss nation, but in later revisions ‘the people’ replaced the 
‘nation’. 
 
Italian and German unification led to a second se dot zone two constitutions. Existing 
constitutional monarchies took the lead in the unification process, and built new nation-
states in the name of the people. However, they started from different points. The 
Piedmont constitution was far more radical than that of Prussia. Italy saw a successful and 
enduring alliance between the liberal and the national projects, united in opposition to the 
Catholic Church. The 1848 Piedmont constitution was written with a view to Italian 
unification, and it left the source of sovereignty: the king held his position by both the grace 
of God and the nation (Hawgood 1964: 200). It went on to become the constitution of 
liberal Italy in 1861, and survived the Mussolini period as well. By contrast autocratic Prussia 
triumphed over its liberal opponents in 1848/49 and the pan-German nationalists in the 
next decades. The 1871 constitution of the Reich did not invoke the nation. 
 
A third set of constitutions are part of zone two in terms of timing, but in terms of state-
building after imperial collapse they are closer to zone three. Even if great power 
intervention ensured a degree of protection for minority rights, these constitutions were 
based on national identity. The tension between these two principles proved enduring. In 
Greece (the 1820s and 1844), Serbia (1835) and the Romanian Principalities of Wallachia 
and Moravia (1848/49) new constitutions were modelled on the US and Belgian 
constitutions, but as a rule they were either a compromises with the Ottoman regime’s 
Organic Statutes (e.g. Serbia 1838) or shaped by bilateral Russian – Ottoman agreements 
(the Principalities after the Crimean War). The conservative 1878 constitution for 
autonomous Bulgaria had been vetted by St. Petersburg. In Austria-Hungary absolutism held 
sway until the 1867 Ausgleigh – the constitutional compromise that governed relations 
between the two parts of the now dual monarchy and made the emperor the constitutional 
king of Hungary. Although this opened the way for ‘Magyarisation’ of the Hungarian half of 
the empire, the remaining constitutional arrangements have been hailed by Lieven (2000: 
184-185) as an abandonment of German domination in favour of an exemplary attempt at 
multinational administration: ‘the Habsburg regime developed a number of laws and 
practices which were later taken up by other civilized societies facing the challenges of 
multi-ethnicity and conflict between races and nationalities.’ However, even Austria saw 
increasing tension between nationalist aspirations for autonomy and the imperial centre. 
These tensions would play out across the area of the three collapsed land empires after the 
First World War, in zone three.  
 
Time Zone Three: After Empire  
Constitutional politics in the third zone, after the First World War, reflected nationalist 
state-building projects more explicitly. They were truly foundational documents: whereas 
German and Italian unification drew on the Prussian and Piedmont constitutional 
experience, almost all the states in the third zone were new states. In this time zone 
constitution-makers  forged a   more explicit link between constitutions and national 
identity. One reason for this was that most    were ‘new’ states with no previous experience 
of statehood. For Brueilly (2007) ‘time zone’ is really a label for ‘structural differences’ based 
on whether there is an already-existing high culture in a territory (time zone two), and 
whether there is an established state (time zone one). These structural differences made  
the approach to constitutions in  time zones three and  four very different. The cultures the  
post-imperial  states considered their own were either peasant folk cultures or long 
suppressed minority cultures,  and the task of nationalism was much greater. Constitution-
making  came to reflect considerable political and social engineering.  
 
The collapse of the European land empires during the First World War led to the creation of 
more than fifteen new states, based on the nationality principle. Of these, only Hungary did 
not adopt a new constitution. The Allies’ war aim had been an international order based on 
the principle of self-determination. This raised the question of how this principle was 
compatible with minority rights. Once the Versailles settlements crumbled, the constitutions 
proved an inadequate framework for minority protection. In some states new constitutions 
were later adopted that were far more explicit about the connection between state and 
nation. These reflected the prevailing currents of European politics in zone three far more 
than the civic republican documents which preceded them.  
 
Although the dependence of the new states on majority nations (e.g. Czechoslovakia on the 
Czechs) was obvious, the first constitutions did not make this explicit. Identifying the state 
with a titular nation was avoided by a reliance on an essentially civic and French conception 
of nationhood. The republican principle substituted for that of constitutional monarchy, and 
‘popular government’ was associated with strong unicameralism, institutions that allow for 
popular control of the executive (such as the referendum), and individual and minority 
rights (McBain and Rogers 1923). The preambles usually avoided reference to a pre-existing 
national self, and committed the state to act in accordance with universal principles. The 
first articles vested sovereignty in the people, not the nation. These constitutions were 
adopted by constituent assembles, and gave to the democratic principle ‘its most complete 
and logical expression’ (Headlam-Morley 1928: 2). They were largely secular. Only Poland’s 
(1921: Article 114)  accorded the Catholic Church a special position, as ‘the religion of the 
preponderant majority of the nation’.  
 
In many respects the democratic imperative meant that the nationalist content of these 
constitutions was low. Most did contain provisions on language, territory and symbolism 
specifically intended to bestow on new states the prestige of the past. The Yugoslav 
constitution of 1921 declared a multi-ethnic kingdom and thus placated Serb fears that the 
name of the state would not mention them (McBain and Rogers 1923: 349). Yet the absence 
of territorial claims was remarkable, especially in Austria, Finland, and the Irish Free State, 
which had recently lost territory. Equally remarkable were the provisions on minority rights, 
which fell far short of naming minorities and bestowing on the state the duty to allow for 
the development of minority cultures. Article 113 of the Weimar constitution (1919) did 
stipulate that the state should not interfere with the free national development of those 
who spoke foreign languages. Hoverer, laws putting these provisions into effect were not 
enacted. The League of Nations had a broad remit in this area, and treaties concerning 
minority protection had been agreed in advance of independence. Poland, Romania, 
Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Greece did not enter into these freely. Albania, the Baltic 
States, Austria, and Hungary were also bound by such treaties.  
 
The treaties were recognised as fundamental laws that could not be contravened by 
domestic legislation, which meant that the domestic constitutions had less importance in 
this area than in zone four. Finland (in 1919) was exceptional in naming Finnish and Swedish 
as equal national languages and allowing for extensive provisions for Swedish Finns’ 
autonomy. As the League of Nations had special procedures for the redress of grievances, 
most constitutions provided only vague and aspirational clauses. The central principles were 
non-discrimination, equal civil rights and free use of one’s mother tongue. They proved 
ineffective, and too rudimentary to meet the needs of minorities. In general, the tendency 
was to renege on the initial promises: Poland, Greece, Yugoslavia, Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia acquired bad reputations in this regard. By 1934 ‘almost every state has 
committed, and every minority suffered under, flagrant violation of the minority treaties’ 
(MacCartney 1934: 390). Where, as in Schleswig-Holstein, the situation of the German 
minority was ‘comparatively favourable’, this had nothing to do with treaties or 
constitutional provisions (Junghann 1932: 69). 
 
If the ambition of constitution-makers had been to give constitutional form to the most 
advanced principles of democracy and to ground national existence in this form, their failure 
reflected the wider failure to secure international order between the wars. Constitutions 
may have been silent on territorial irredentism, but such claims were forcibly articulated in 
practice. Minority rights may have been enshrined in constitutions, but they were usually 
overridden. The later, more authoritarian constitutions better reflected the logic of the 
marriage of state and nation Gellner saw in zone three. The preamble to the 1935 Polish 
constitution defined the state as a ‘bequest: a historic heritage from generation to 
generation’. The shift from liberalism was predictable in states like Greece, Ireland and 
Poland where rival nationalist conceptions of the state shaped party politics. This was most 
pronounced in Catholic countries (Austria, Ireland, Lithuania, Poland), but was not confined 
to them. The basis for the state ceased to be the democratic public, and became the unified 
nation. The Mextaxas dictatorship in Greece (1936) was inspired by Salazar’s Portugal; 
Austria became a ‘Christian state’ in 1934; and the preamble to the Irish 1937 constitution 
drew on the Polish model (it began: ‘in the Name of the most holy Trinity’). 
 
Many of these new nation-states did not survive; almost all their initial constitutions failed. 
Indeed it was only in those European states whose constitutional traditions were rooted in 
zones one and two (which includes Finland and Ireland) that the inter-war era did not prove 
fatal. The initial democratic consensus was deceptive. Austria was divided over unification 
with Germany. In Finland the issue of a republic divided the victors in the 1918 civil war. In 
Ireland the issue of dominion versus republic led to a civil war in 1922. In Germany 
nationalists regarded the republic as a sell-out. Greece was a ‘stillborn republic’ where the 
question of constitutional form remained profoundly divisive. Hungary settled for a kingdom 
without a king. In Yugoslavia the question of whether the new state was a continuation of 
the pre-war monarchy was fudged in the 1921 constitution. Consensus on constitutional 
forms thus concealed a range of nationalist conflicts, which external imposition 
exacerbated. In Czechoslovakia (1918 and 1920), where the Allies virtually imposed a federal 
constitution and prescribed local autonomy for Ruthenia, the very form of the state was an 
external imposition (Mair 1928: 27). Constitutionalism could not survive. However, these 
constitutions sometimes contained clauses pointing to a more nationalist conception of the 
state, and thus a more explicit marriage between state and nation.  
 
Time Zone Four: The Post-Communist States 
 
The  collapse of communism brought about a triple transition: to democracy, free markets 
and to national sovereignty. In earlier waves of democratisation  new constitutions; for Italy 
and  Germany (in 1947 and 1949) , and  for Greece, Portugal and Spain( in 1975, 1976 and 
1978), were about  the  transitions to liberal democracy. Admittedly, the Italian and Spanish 
constitutions addressed questions of regional autonomy, and the German constitution was 
named the Basic Law with a view to eventual unification. But otherwise these constitutions 
conformed to a strong  liberal norm; they did not represent a distinct time zone of European 
nationalism. In much of Central and Eastern Europe however, Soviet rule had suppressed 
nationalism and also obliterated civil society. In the eventual  transition from communism, 
nationalism re-emerged as the most important ideological rival to western liberalism, and 
became a key component of state-building.  
 
An aspect of the East and Central European experience remarked upon by Gellner (1997: 37) 
is that one begins with an almost pure non-national political system and ends with an ideally 
pure national system. This holds for constitutions too. In zone four, after the collapse of 
communism, they symbolised the regaining of sovereign status. The distinction between 
new and old states is important, since many post-communist preambles claim a link to a 
past, and are explicit about the marriage of state and nation. In zone three the democratic 
republic had supplanted empires and monarchies, but in zone four the nation assumed that 
role. Both represented ‘new beginnings’ in repudiating authoritarian rule, but those in zone 
four were less sanguine about integrating minorities. The constitutions contained more 
detailed provisions for minority rights, and usually incorporated international legal norms in 
that area. The three categories of states in zone four are (1) old states: Poland, Albania, 
Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania; (2) restored states: the three Baltic States; and (3) states 
which emerged through the dissolution of supra-national federal states. The restored states 
were the more ethno-nationalist, passing laws reflecting the pre-eminence of the titular 
nationality (Rich 1996: 277). Among the rest, despite their ‘thick’ nationalist content, the 
situation on the ground was often better than the texts suggested (ibid: 288). 
 
Constitutions may express hopes for the future, but a more powerful motivation is ‘fear 
originating in, and related to the previous regime’ (Zajo 1999: 2). One example is the 
prominence given to self-determination in some constitutions, such as Estonia’s (1992), and 
in the distinction made between sovereignty and independence. The former refers to the 
states’ competences, while the latter denotes independent statehood (Albi 1995: 25). After 
1945 the USSR controlled communist states’ internal sovereignty in practice, although they 
formally retained independent statehood (Albi 1995: 29). Accordingly, nine out of ten CEE 
constitutions made this distinction. Sovereignty provisions are protected by special 
safeguards, and at the outset there were no provisions for the transfer of powers to 
international organisations (Albi 1995: 25). In Estonia the requirement for referendums 
reflected the historical fact that the President permitted the invasion of Soviet troops in 
1940 (Albi 1995: 30). That the requirement exists in all the Baltic states is linked both to the 
fear of Russia and the preference for the referendum inherited from zone three.  
 
In the preambles liberal proceduralism was deemed an insufficient source of unity, so the 
political community looked for its ‘substantive supplement’ in history (Priban 2004: 415). 
One past (the communist past) was condemned, and another restored (Priban 2004: 428). 
The Czech preamble (1992, as Czechoslovakia as dissolved) expresses a purely civic 
conception of nationhood, proclaiming loyalty to ‘all the good traditions of the ancient 
statehood of Czech Crown Lands’ and invoking the ‘renewal’ of the pre-war state, which had 
included Slovakia. The Slovak preamble (of the same year) is more ethnic, beginning with 
‘We, the Slovak nation’ and invoking the ‘spiritual heritage’ of Cyril and Methodius and the 
legacy of the Great Moravian Empire. The Polish 1997 preamble uses the phrase ‘We the 
Polish Nation’ and pays homage to their ancestors’ struggle for independence, while trying 
to synthesize Catholic and secular values. The Baltic states’ preambles claim continuity with 
the pre-war states, one using the phrase the ‘reborn state of Lithuania’ (1992). In the 
Balkans, the 1992 Yugoslav preamble mentioned the ‘nation-building traditions’ and the 
strong historical ties between Serbia and Montenegro, while the Croat 1990 constitution 
speaks of the ‘millennial’ identity of the Croat nation and the continuity of its statehood.  
 
Pruess (1995: 8) links the process of carrying out a revolution within an existing constitution 
in Central Europe to the primacy given to the rule of law. He rejects (ibid: 16) the concept of 
a pre-constitutional potential as the driving force in constitution-making. Yet these 
constitutions either located sovereignty exclusively in the people, or the nation rivalled the 
people as the constitutional subject. Article 4 of the 1997 Polish constitution states that 
supreme power shall be vested in the nation (Article 2 in the 1992 ‘little constitution’ had 
the same wording). The Lithuanian preamble begins by saying that the Lithuanian ‘nation’ 
had established the state many centuries ago. The Estonian preamble refers to the exercise 
of ‘national self-determination’ which established the state in 1918. Article 3 of the 1991 
Slovene constitution declared that Slovenia is founded on the permanent and inalienable 
right of the Slovene ‘nation’ to self-determination. The Croat 1990 constitution defined 
Croatia as a ‘national state’, as was true for Macedonia. Romania was defined as an 
‘indivisible nation state’ in its 1991 constitution. The preamble to the Bulgarian constitution 
refers to the duty to defend the ‘national and state integrity’ of Bulgaria.  
 
Drawing on precedents established by their communist constitutions, some countries 
(Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia – all 1991) name ‘national minorities’, while others (Slovakia, 
Poland, Hungary) refer to ‘national or ethnic minorities’. The Hungarian constitution (article 
68, after total re-write of the 1949 communist constitution in 1989-90) referred to 
minorities which ‘represent a constituent part of the state’. The same term was written into 
the preamble of the new, more nationalist, constitution in 2011. Poland’s constitution 
mentions ‘the Polish nation – every citizen of the Republic’ as the source of constitutional 
power. In these constitutions, the bearer of sovereignty is implicitly a multi-cultural people 
and minorities have special rights. In Slovakia however minorities are not part of this 
people, since the sovereign nation is culturally defined. The Baltic constitutions do not 
mention Russian-speakers or use the term national minorities; many Russians were denied 
automatic citizenship. Bulgaria forbids ethnic parties (1991, article 11). Despite this wide 
diversity, there is no longer a presumption in favour of assimilation. Minority rights usually 
include non-discrimination, the right to use one’s own language, fair representation, 
autonomy and the right to develop one’s culture. Crucially, responsibility for the 
development of minority cultures is now usually vested in the state (in zone three this 
applied only in Finland). 
 
The constitutional basis of citizenship laws have posed the question of how respect for 
persons was possible when the ideals of national identity and political community were 
foundational constitutional principles (MacCormick 1994: 79). The initial Czech laws, based 
on ius soli citizenship rights, had allowed them to deport Slovakians after the separation 
(Kellas 2004: 152). The Baltic language and citizenship laws reflected the dominance of the 
titular nationality, and denied automatic citizenship to those not born or descended from 
those born in the independence period. The preamble to the Croat constitution 
distinguishes between the Croat nation and the rest, who are citizens (Rich 1996: 277-81). 
The Polish constitution of 1921 had stated that sovereignty belonged to the nation, and 
referred to Polish citizens ‘belonging to national minorities’, implying that citizenship was 
not equivalent to membership of the Polish nation. The 1997 constitution says ‘We the 
Polish nation, all citizens of the Republic …’. Hungary allows all Hungarians resident outside 
of its borders the right of return, and the constitution recognizes the responsibilities of the 
country for their welfare (1989-90, article 6; 2011, article D). Only the Bulgarian constitution 
explicitly states ius sanguinis as the primary basis for acquiring nationality, and Bulgarians 
not resident in Bulgaria have all the rights and obligations of citizenship, including the 
requirement to do military service (Elster, Offe and Preuss 1998: 89).  
 
If time and space are the two fundamental variables in Gellner’s framework, the thick 
nationalist content and the rejection of the civic model of constructing new political 
communities in zone four confirm its relevance. The collapse of the Soviet order led to the 
creation of a multi-polar system, and nationalism provided the building blocks of the system 
and the mechanism of integration at both the symbolic and sociological levels. The 
institutional and economic discontinuity these societies experienced during the transition 
led them to turn to ‘the substantive rationality of principles and values’, which allowed the 
constitutions anchor people in the new reality (Priban, 2004: 409). Yet the contrast between 
zones is not between an authentic and a sociologically naive conception of political 
community, since the constitutions of zone four might not survive a decade like the 1930s. 
Moreover, the current degree of ethnic homogeneity compared to the inter-war era is 
significant. None of the constitutions, however, mention Roma minorities. Where, as in the 
Baltics and the Balkans, more diversity exists, the marriage of state and nation is 
problematic. The tension between nationalism and liberalism endures, and the wider 
European context provides the crucial arena in which it will play out. 
 
Time Zone Five: Globalization and the European Union  
 
There is no fifth zone in Gellner apart from an Islamic one. This implies that the age of 
nationalism in Europe reached its apogee after the end of communism. Yet the existence of 
a fifth zone suggests that  the role nationalist ideas play in constitutional life extends 
beyond that of marking transitions from Empire or from ‘non-national’ to nation-states.  A 
central insight into why this is not the case can be gleaned from Language and Solitude 
where Gellner (1989) thought that, apart from affluence, a devolution of power to the sub-
national level could be accompanied by a shift to bodies that dealt with issues like the 
environment and terrorism at the supra-national level. This shift has produced a fifth zone 
shaped by the twin pressure put on the nation state by sub-state nationalism and the 
process of European integration. 
 
 This zone thus represents a clear crisis of internationalism. In this crisis the liberal argument 
for constitutional reform is often presented as coming ‘from above’, while populist  
challenges are presented as coming ‘from below’. These distinctions only make sense in  the  
context of European integration and globalisation. After 1989  the ‘Washington consensus’ 
had extended to the benefits of liberal democracy, free markets and international trade.  
Because these ideas were tied to European and also global institutions,  populism was one 
way of breaking the elite consensus in favour of more internationalism. Beginning in the 
1990s populist parties began to challenge   this consensus. The financial crises, widespread 
Islamist terrorism and the refugee crisis of 2015 presented them with new grievances and 
new opportunities.  Just as the broken economics exposed in 2008 spilled over into the 
electoral realm – bringing turbulence if not chaos to several countries – it also spilled over 
into the constitutional realm. The tension between constitutionalism, liberalism and 
nationalism now  plays out in three different ways.  
 
First, minority nationalist parties challenged existing political settlements in the UK, Spain 
and Belgium. These parties work within the limits of constitutional orders that were 
specifically designed to regulate long-standing conflicts, but with the EU crises some have 
begun to argue for more radical alternatives. A series of amendments to the 1830 Belgian 
constitution, including one that makes is ‘a federal state composed of Communities and 
Regions’, reflect increasing polarization between French-speaking Walloons and Dutch-
speaking Flemish citizens. The Scottish Nationalist Party used the constitutional powers 
devolved to the Scottish parliament in order to demand a referendum on full independence 
in 2013. But the UK vote in 2016 to leave the EU turned constitutional politics into such a 
zero sum game, since both Scotland and Northern Ireland voted by large majorities to 
remain in the EU. In Spain a successful constitutional order came under threat as the 
Catalans demanded a Scottish-style referendum on independence. Article two of the 1978 
constitution states that ‘The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish 
nation, while at the same time guarantees ‘the right to self-government of the nationalities 
and regions of which it is composed’. While the Catalans want a referendum on full 
independence, Madrid argues that the constitution prohibits secession. In all three cases we 
see confirmation of an old truism of politics: successful resolution of one problem leads to 
the creation in its place, by an essentially dialectical process, of new problems, or indeed to 
the re-emergence of the original problem in a new guise’ (Clapham 2017: 106).Obviously 
nationalists hoped that autonomy would provide a platform for the growth of nationalist 
consciousness, and for eventual separation. The Belgian, Brtish and Spanish states wagered 
in contrast that by allowing for the expression of identity, there would be no need for 
further separation. The jury is still out on the final outcomes: no state has broken up, but 
the challenges to the integrity of the states have escalated during the current economic 
crisis.  
 
Second, the early 2000s have seen the growth of national populism in Western Europe, and 
various forms of ‘blowback constitutionalism’: constitutions which were intended to settle 
issues linked to nationhood – including EU membership – have invited further constitutional 
challenges. In Denmark and the Netherlands populist parties that based their appeal on 
immigration have mobilised the losers of globalization and European integration, and called 
for referendums on EU membership. In Italy, Austria, Greece and the UK populists quickly 
extended protest politics to constitutional conflict. In Greece and the UK, nationalist 
populism shook the entire political system. David Cameron lost the UK referendum on EU 
membership by a 52 – 48 % margin in June 2016, and this ‘Brexit’ vote will have implications 
for devolved government in Scotland, the Northern Irish peace process, and even perhaps 
for the prerogative of the Crown. In Greece, the once-dominant PASOK and New Democracy 
were seriously weakened by the financial crisis, and lost the January 2015 election to 
populist and nationalist parties. The left wing Syriza-Anel coalition won on an anti-austerity 
ticket, and has since proposed a raft of constitutional changes, including much greater use 
of direct democracy and direct election of the President.  
 
Third, in post-communist Europe, the 2000s have also seen a new challenges to liberal 
constitutional settlements – backsliding (Platner and Diamond 2007). In some cases this 
involves authoritarian practices hollowing out democracy, resulting in considerable 
differences between formal institutions and the informal exercise of power (Sedelmeier 
2014). Examples include limits on media freedom, restrictions on the power of independent 
regulators, and the politicisation of the judiciary and central banks. The EU’s tools for 
suspending wayward members is very limited. Consequently, the tension between 
liberalism and nationalism plays out within the parameters of EU membership. Gati (2007) 
identified ‘backsliding’ in the early 2000s in Hungary Poland, Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic: all four Central European cases. Hungary acquired a new constitution in 2011, and 
three years later the prime minister advocated a new model of ‘illiberal democracy’. In 
Romania, too, the government’s failure to comply with the judgments of the constitutional 
court in the conflict between president Traian Băsescu and prime minister Victor Ponta in 
2012, attracted criticism from the EU (Reding 2013). In Poland in 2015, the new national 
populist Law and Justice government swiftly replaced its predecessor’s constitutional court 
appointees and restricted court’s power, earning criticism from the European Commission 
and the European Parliament (2016) for failing to uphold the rule of law. All three cases 
involved an open clash between liberal and nationalist values.  
 
 
Five Patterns  
Our conclusion is that the constitutional relationship between state and nation differs 
systematically across the zones, and that the importance of national identity has increased 
over time. The first constitutions emerged in states where a degree of constitutionalism and 
limited government had been introduced by codification of laws and rights, and in states 
which boundaries were comparatively well-established. No great constitutional changes 
were necessary during the age of nationalism. The constitutions of zone two were written in 
a context where liberalism and nationalism joined forces, but were not explicitly nationalist 
in content. After 1918, the Versailles settlements were followed by a republican approach to 
the nationalities question. Since both the states and the nations were new, nationalist ideas 
took on more of a role in marking a break with the past. Despite the supposed ‘end of 
history’ in 1989, constitutional politics in zone four and five have involved much more 
explicit conflicts about national identity. National identity and citizenship became debated 
in ‘thick’ national terms. European integration first provided liberal parameters for this 
debate, but now the EU itself has become a new target for those with nationalist agendas.  
 
Unsurprisingly, the most enduring constitutions have been those that are most flexible, both 
in matters of institutional arrangements and sources of sovereignty. In zone one, the Nordic 
states and the UK have been the most stable, but even here constitutional politics has 
involved questions of national identity at some point, and the compatibility of national 
sovereignty with European integration became challenged in most of these states. In zone 
two, most of the alliances between national and liberalist projects proved unsustainable, 
whether because of conflict with non-nationalist monarchs or because they came up against 
‘thicker’ nationalist projects later on. In zone three ‘blowback’ politics soon trumped liberal 
arrangements, but not in a uniform pattern. In zone four the contest between liberal 
cosmopolitan parties and Christian nationals has been a significant element of party politics 
in almost every state, but the result have been very different in such states. The very 
existence of a fifth zone suggests that the constitutional outcomes of zone four remain to be 
seen.  
 
Yet if Gellner’s zones capture these patterns, the question is whether his theory of 
nationalism explains them. For Gellner the marriage of state and nation has been produced 
by the necessary marriage of state and culture, and the fate of the polities determined by 
the congruence, or lack of it, between the two. Yet the international context and domestic 
political contests determine the constitutional outcomes. We have therefore added two 
factors to Gellner’s; first, the domestic political contests that shaped constitutions; and 
second the extent to which their content was shaped by foreign constitutions, the need for 
Great Power approval, or the requirements of international treaties and organisations. In 
zone one the role that the Great Powers played in vetting regime-change helped ensure a 
degree of predictability. In zone two the ‘marriage’ required only the states to be built. In 
zone three, the Versailles settlement provides a better guide to constitutional content than 
domestic politics, but party political contests between ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ nationalists later 
undermined many of the constitutions. Likewise, the triple transitions mark a fourth time 
zone, where the broad outlines of potential conflicts are comparable, but the main source of 
common content was what is required by the Council of Europe and the European Union. As 
these institutions became less authoritative, constitutional orders became less liberal in 
zone five. Although some national constitutions, such as that of the US, remain influential, 
the degree to which constitutions reflect such international influences has increased since 
zone one. 
 
One issue that complicates Gellner’s approach is the role organised religion has played in 
the politics of homogeneity. This issue would require its own chapter, but the role played by 
religion does not conform to the patterns of his time zones. Contemporary European states 
had, as potential sources of inspiration, three older constitutions that had provided for 
religious freedom: Belgium (1931), Switzerland (1874) and the United States (1787 ). Some 
European countries  followed suit by advancing the concept of religious freedom in their 
constitutions. Examples were Czechoslovakia (1920), the Kingdom of Serbs Croats and 
Slovenes (1921), the Soviet Union (1918) and the Weimar Republic (1919). Notably these 
states were multi-confessional at the time of their inception. In contrast, the constitutions 
of Denmark (1915), Norway (1814), and Sweden (1809) provided for a state religion in 
societies that were very homogenous. A later trend, begun by Poland in 1921 was for 
constitutions to explicitly identify the nation with the majority (Catholic) religion, and to 
reflect Catholic social teaching. Austria (1934), Ireland (1937) Portugal (1933) and Spain 
(1938-1978) are also examples. Gellner’s time zones do not capture this aspect of the 
marriage of state and nation. It ignores religious divisions, and no one approach to religious 
homogeneity predominates in each of the first three zones. Gellner’s schema was inspired 
by the Central European experience, in which the gradual dominance of the nationalist 
principle emerged through specific eras. A different approach to Europe’s political 
geography would highlight the importance of inherited religious differences - older critical 
junctures - to the politics of homogeneity, especially in the more peripheral parts of Europe. 
 
In terms of spatial patterns nationalism originated in western Europe, travelled east and 
south, but now challenges the territorial integrity of Belgium, Spain and the UK, states 
largely formed before the age of nationalism. We see no diminution in the importance of 
nationalism in any part of Europe; the old tension between liberalism and nationalism has 
just found a new Europe-wide context. Nonetheless the relationship between liberalism and 
nationalism continues to vary across states. Some democracies saw nationalist politics 
increase in times of plenty, even if support for new populist parties of the right (e.g. the 
Sweden Democrats, France’s national Front and the Party of Freedom in the Netherlands) 
and the left (the Socialist Party in the Netherlands and Italy’s Five Star Movement) have 
grown with the financial crisis. But, mostly, they did so without new thinking about 
constitutions. In contrast, ‘democratic backsliding’ involves not only a rebellion against 
liberal elites, but opposition to the international regime that the new democratic elites and 
constitutions were part of. The Hungarian changes began in 2010, when Viktor Orbán’s 
Fidesz won the election and achieved the parliamentary seats required s to change the 
constitution. His government quickly proved highly critical of the EU, of international 
capitalism, of the supposed prevalence of the former communist elite, and of independent 
media, agencies and the court system – all in the name of the Christian Hungarian nation 
and its rights to self-determination. A new constitution was adopted a year later  
 
Hall (2003) reflected that Gellner’s theory does not account for the role of the state and the 
international factors which determine when homogenisation policies of various kinds are 
pursued. There is a fundamental difference between the sociology of the state before the 
nation, and the state-building projects that run into the problem of mass nationalism. This 
difference is manifest in the constitutions. In the first two zones liberalism was in the 
ascendant, and those written in zone one generally survived the clash between liberalism 
and nationalism. In zone two liberal constitutions triumphed in Belgium, Italy, and 
Switzerland but failed elsewhere. In zone three most new constitutions did not survive the 
clash with nationalism. The jury is still out on the post-communist cases, but in zone five 
liberalism has increasingly been identified with European integration. The dominance of the 
nation-state formula has emerged gradually. The crucial break with the pre-nationalist 
world was with the establishment of constitutional monarchies, where the sovereign, unlike 
an Emperor, is made the object of contestation on behalf of non-state actors. Whether 
conceived in terms of parliament, opposition groups or social strata, the language of rights 
and liberties can only develop in a system where the state is separable from the ruler, and 
will inevitably concern claims on behalf of the people. Then in the late Nineteenth Century, 
democratization comes to denote inclusion and recognition rather than rights and 
guarantees of autonomy. This differentiates the liberal from the republican and nationalist 
approaches in zones three and four. Finally, the nationalist constitutional formula becomes 
predominant in zone four, after both the liberal and civic republican constitutions had failed 
to create a basis for political community in earlier zones.  
 
Time zone five is the product of a new polarity. All the constitutions drafted during the 
tenure of the Council of Europe assumed that integration at the international and domestic 
levels would complement each other. Now it seems to many a case of either or, and the 
comparative advantage of nationalists in this argument is that the case for more integration 
globally is seen as coming from ‘above’ and being technocratic. The Portuguese case 
exemplifies the pressures European integration and globalisation are now placing on 
national constitutions. Portugal went through a prolonged transition to democracy between 
1974 and the dissolution of the Council of the Revolution in 1982, the legacy of which was 
consistent support for moderate parties, a strong aversion against radicalism and support 
for EU policies. Yet in October 2015, when the ruling conservatives lost their majority, the 
prospect of a leftist government – of the radical Left Bloc and the Communists - led 
President Cavaco Silva to use his constitutional powers to try to block their coming to 
power. Silva spoke of the need to block ‘radical change’ (in effect a departure from the 
Commission’s fiscal austerity) by ‘anti-European forces’. This resulted in the country’s 
biggest constitutional crisis since 1982.  
 
Gellner did not see the potential for conflict produced by the emergence of globalization 
and the pressure put on the nation state by sub-state nationalism and European integration. 
In Conditions of Liberty (1994: 125-128) he argued that, after communism, nationalism 
would be strongest in the east because of the absence of civil society. Yet in both eastern 
and western Europe, the constitution is the arena in which these two pressures intersect. 
Yet Gellner was not wrong to foresee this as a period of peace. The return of nationalist 
constitutionalism has not needed ethnic conflict - or problems of ethnic coexistence - to 
flourish. It seems that there is a marriage between nation and state in constitutional terms, 
because these documents exists at the intersection point between pressures for regional 
integration and those for devolution: in this conflict no one is arguing for the 
homogenization policies of the third time zone. So while we do not see horizontal conflict 
between ethnic groups, there is a vertical axis to nationalist challenges that is about 
protecting a space for values associated with the nation state against elites and institutions 
that are situated above the nation state. The rise of radical right and populist parties also 
raises the spectre of homogenisation policies aimed at immigrants, rather than against 
‘national minorities’. When the EU responded to the refugee crisis of 2015 by establishing a 
quota system, the Hungarian and Polish governments justified their non-compliance as a 
defence of national identity in the face of misguided liberalism and EU imperialism. It may 
be that, because of the effectivenesss of past homogenization policies, there is actually less 
- in terms of ethnic differences - to tolerate on the ground. Yet the absence of ethnic conflict 
may be due to the very constitutional systems that have invited so many challenges. The 
Spanish system of autonomía may frustrate Catalan nationalists, but has largely pacified the 
Basque country. The UK’s recognition of a rough equality between its constituent nations 
and the state in respect of constitutional issues is one reason for the absence of polarisation 
(Keating 2015). Belgium’s system of language rights and federalism can be read as a source 
of polarisation, or as a system of checks and balances that explains the absence of ethnic 
riots and violence (Adams 2014: 301). Survey evidence shows that European minorities do 
not see independence in absolutist terms (as being fully in or out of the existing state), an 
outlook encouraged by the EU constitutional framework (Keating 2015). The European 
tradition of recognising ethnic and linguistic differences preceded the EEC, and forms part of 
a repertoire of institutional responses to cultural pluralism that may be responsible for 
diminishing the amount of ethnic conflict worldwide (Cederman et al, forthcoming).  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Constitution-making is usually generic, reflecting modular forms and common international 
pressures. This allows the European experience to be analysed in terms of zones, and can 
highlight exceptional cases: the long lasting Finnish constitution (replaced only in 2000), or 
the survival of the republican model in France. Viewing individual constitutions in their 
zones also allows consideration of the impact of liberalism. The Greek constitutional order 
has been unstable, but the liberal legacy from their struggles with the Ottoman Empire in 
zone two is still important. Ultimately, a large part of modern European constitutionalism is 
about liberalism and no democratic constitution can depart fully from its values. On the one 
hand, liberalism provided the central impetus for constitutional challenges to the state in 
zones one and two. On the other, the nationalist dimension to European constitutional 
history inevitably emerges with the rise of the people as the source of sovereignty , which 
makes the tension with liberalism pivotal. One cannot see this conflict going away; the 
tension between liberalism and nationalism has just found a new political context. The 
original (1983) Gellner clung to his view that it was the earliest stages of industrialism - with 
people at the gate of the new world, ‘but not yet inside it’ - that will have produced the 
worst excesses of nationalism (1983: 113). His forecast was that affluence, a narrower gap 
between rich and poor, and a convergence in life styles across borders, would deprive 
nationalist conflicts of their sharpness (ibid: 119-121). Nationalism would persist, ‘in a 
milder, less virulent form’ (ibid). However, in  Language and Solitude he saw things 
differently. The anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski was praised in that book for his 
combination of ‘cultural pluralist nationalism’ with ‘political internationalism’ (1998: 188). 
Malinowski’s own origins in Hapsburg Galicia, where the empire allowed the flourishing of 
Polish culture while not allowing separatism, are no doubt significant (Kumar 2015: 79). This 
later Gellner (1998: 76, 188) also wanted ‘culture to be protected, but politics to be 
restrained by higher authority’ (ibid 188)). And this combination was now desirable because 
of the need to protect the world from environmental disaster, nuclear arms, and global 
terrorism. The agencies dealing with such issues will be supra-national; those dealing with 
schooling or social welfare may become sub-ethnic. In short, effective political units ‘will be 
either larger or smaller than national units based on similarities of high culture’. Gellner 
expressed doubts about whether such a programme could be enforced on ‘warring ethnic 
factions: he believed nonetheless, that ‘this is our only hope’ (1998: 144). Yet we have 
shown that it is the very attempt ‘to deprive political systems of sovereignty – ‘while 
allowing their absolute freedom of culture’ (1998: 144) – that has put European 
constitutional orders under such strain, and guaranteed a future role for nationalism in the 
constitutional history of modern Europe. 
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